



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/884
14 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

(for the period from 17 May to 14 November 1997)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past six months in pursuance of the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently by resolution 1109 (1997) of 28 May 1997.

II. SITUATION IN THE AREA AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

2. During the period under review the ceasefire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained without serious incident and the Force's area of operation remained calm. UNDOF supervised the area of separation by means of fixed positions and patrols to ensure that no military forces were in it. The Force also carried out fortnightly inspections of armament and force levels in the areas of limitation. Liaison officers from the party concerned accompanied the inspection teams. As in the past, both sides denied inspection teams access to some of their positions and imposed some restrictions on the Force's freedom of movement. UNDOF assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment was provided to the local population on request.

3. On 30 May 1997, two Austrian soldiers were shot and killed during a routine foot patrol east of position 14 near Hadar. Regrettably, the investigations carried out by the Syrian authorities and UNDOF, in cooperation with the Government of Austria, have not so far shed any light on who carried out the attack and what the motives for it were. The Syrian authorities have informed UNDOF that they are continuing their investigation. I wish to express my appreciation to the Government of Canada, which provided technical assistance for the analysis of evidence.

4. As of November 1997, UNDOF comprised 1,053 troops from Austria, Canada, Japan and Poland (464, 186, 45 and 358 troops respectively). UNDOF was assisted

in the performance of its tasks by 78 military observers detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Major-General David Stapleton (Ireland) took over the command from Major-General Johannes C. Kusters (Netherlands), who completed his tour of duty on 31 May 1997. A map showing the Force's deployment is attached.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

5. By its resolution 51/232 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNDOF an amount of \$33,616,400 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent to \$2,801,366 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the current mandate of UNDOF.

6. Unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNDOF as at 31 October 1997 amounted to \$50.9 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 31 October 1997 amounted to \$1.6 billion.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

7. In deciding in its resolution 1109 (1997) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973) were dealt with in my report on the situation in the Middle East (A/52/467), submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 51/28 of 4 December 1996.

V. OBSERVATIONS

8. UNDOF, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the ceasefire called for by the Security Council and the agreement on disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the cooperation of the parties. The situation in the Israeli-Syrian sector has remained quiet and there has been no serious incident.

9. Despite the present quiet in the Israeli-Syrian sector, the situation in the Middle East continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

10. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 1998. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

11. In making this recommendation, I must draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some \$50.9 million. This sum, far larger than the current annual budget of UNDOF, represents money owed to Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

12. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General David Stapleton and to the men and women under his command. They have performed with efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those that provide the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.



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LETTER DATED 28 OCTOBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a document transmitted to me by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The document is an official report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees concerning the case of Mr. Niyonzima Ntagungira Gerard and calls for no comment on our part.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the report circulated in extenso as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Andre Mwamba KAPANGA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Note concerning the written statement of CI Niyonzima Ntagungira Gerard, a Rwandan refugee in Bangui.

1. Acting on instructions received from the local representative on 22 August 1997 regarding the hearing of the aforementioned CI on the letter submitted by him, we saw the individual in question on 25 and 26 August.
2. He recognized his writing and declared that he wrote the statement fully aware that it would inevitably implicate some of his Rwandan compatriots who were high-ranking officers in the former Force Armée Rwandaise (FAR). He also stated that the letter was addressed to Mrs. Goumba, a Rwandan national, currently the spouse of Mr. Abel Goumba, leader of the Front Patriotique pour le Progrès (FPP).
3. Niyonzima also again gave a detailed account of the facts as described in his written statement. He also declared that some of the military officers were currently in Bangui, namely:
 - (1) Lieutenant Colonel Bivugaragabo
 - (2) Majors Kanyamibwa (Pilot)
Kinyoni
Ntirikina
Mudacumur
 - (3) Captain Hitamana
 - (4) Deputy adviser Kayondo
4. The CI also stated that he wrote the statement to inform Mrs. Goumba to whom he had earlier given a verbal account. He now claims that he is being threatened by his own people who are at present in Bangui and have already heard about his letter. They reportedly consider him a traitor. Consequently, he says that he is in danger and is unable to go to Bouka. He is therefore asking to be repatriated to Rwanda and claims to be a Hutu moderate.
5. His particulars are as follows:

DOB: 16 May 1967; POB: Mukingo/Rehengeri (Rwanda)

Profession: Accountant at Rwanda National University

Marital status: Bachelor, no children.

Date of arrival in Zaire: 15 October 1994, at Mugunga

Departure from Mugunga to Tingi-Tingi: 28 February 1997

Arrival in CAR: 22 July 1997 via M'baiki (Lobaye)

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Claims that his father is Hutu and his mother Tutsi.

DONE at Bangui, 28 August 1997

Guy-Rufin Guernas, Protection Assistant

On 1 October 1996, we were in the Mugunga refugee camp when the town of Goma was attacked. The ex-FAR who were with us ordered us to leave the camp. There was a discussion between colonel Nkundiye, G4 ex-FAR Headquarters, and Captain Hakizimana, commander, Paratroop Battalion. Hakizimana wanted the refugees to go into the camp, but Nkundiye refused. That is why Captain Hakizimana decided to return to Rwanda through the volcanoes with about 200 ex-FAR armed soldiers. Their aim was to cause trouble in the prefecture of Ruhengeri.

On 3 October 1996, we left the Rugunga camp for Sake and on the way stopped at Nyamirambo. Behind us was the town of Goma, where the war was going on, and on our right there was an armed band of Banyama. These were ex-FAR on their way to Masisi to get the cattle of the Ba Tutsi which provided the Mugunga refugee camp with meat. On our left there was lake Kivu and the headquarters of the ex-FAR with their heavy weapons. So the only way was straight ahead.

At 8 p.m. on 15 October 1996, Colonel Rwamamywa gave the order to destroy all heavy weapons, the ONATRACOM buses and all the State vehicles they had looted and told all the young men to proceed ahead. But this same Rwamanywa was the one who had the entire State treasury. Even the money deposited by the RDR was taken care of by him and Major Mbarushimana, the private secretary of the Head of State, Major-General Bizimungu Augustin.

On the night of 15 October 1996, we took the forest trail to Masisi and spent the night there. In the morning, they went to get the cows and passed mortars belonging to Kabira's young soldiers. That morning, a lot of ex-FAR were killed. We were taken hostage and our job was to carry boxes of grenades, mortar shells, rockets, strims (rifle grenades), heavy weapons, etc. We travelled more than 500 kilometres through the forest to get to Walikale.

The ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and FAZ (Zairian Armed Forces) met up in Walikale. We stayed there for eight days but the population kept moving towards Kisangani along the paved road. On the ninth day we started out towards Kisangani, Zaire's third largest city and, after travelling 120 kilometres, we stopped in Tingi-Tingi and Amisi where refugees had set up camps and there were representatives of organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

The ex-FAR and FAZ took that opportunity to organize and train for a counter-attack. Military police were patrolling and if they caught you wandering around rather than participating in the training, without having a medical dispensation signed by a doctor, you were in trouble. They took you to see Major Mudacumura, who was in charge of new recruits; he decided whether or not you should be killed. He was the operations commander near the Oso river bridge, where there was a defense post. Many ex-FAR and ex-FAZ soldiers had

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died there because they were raw recruits with little military training. Even the white Yugoslav mercenaries had lost six of their own.

When the ex-FAZ realized that they were losing the battle, they retreated, leaving a Puma helicopter and a small transport plane in Tingi-Tingi. When Colonel Ntiwiragabo arrived, he ordered everything destroyed and that was when Air Force Major Kanyamibwa gave the order to kill the 40 prisoners as well as the patients in the hospital so that they could not provide military secrets to the winning side.

We left Tingi-Tingi on the night of 28 February 1997 and on 1 March 1997 headed towards Lubutu-Kisangani. When we arrived in Lubutu Major Kanyamibwa personally killed four young men with his own pistol because they refused to carry cartridge cases.

At a distance of 100 kilometres from Kisangani, the ex-FAZ in charge of security at the refugee camp told the ex-FAR that the refugees were not to be allowed into the city because they were too dirty.

We left the paved road and went left towards the Ubundu with Major Mugaragu.

On 15 March 1997 we crossed the Ubundu River (where the Ubundu-Kisangani Railway is located) and took the forest road in order to avoid meeting any more soldiers.

On 2 April 1997 we arrived at a crossroads where we hoped to find transportation to Kisangani. Major Mugaragu had eight people killed one by one after which the others tried to follow the others.

On 19 April 1997 we arrived at the village of Mondimbi, where the Americans had built. We were now with Captain Mubirigi who ordered an attack on the parish to loot and steal cattle. They killed four civilians; the priests had already fled because of the general climate of insecurity.

On 29 April 1997 we arrived at the village of Yemo, which was full of merchandise. Captain Mubirigi ordered everyone who was carrying ammunition to throw it into the forest and destroy it because we were very far from Kabila's soldiers. He did not act out of pity for us, on the contrary. The soldiers looted the village, mistreating and raping the Zairian women and girls, and even killed a girl who had refused to sleep with a Rwandan corporal.

This time we had to carry goods: salt, sugar, rice, oil, even dead goats.

We spent the entire month of May in the forest, eating only cassava leaves; the soldiers hunted for food.

On 9 June 1997 we arrived in the village of Mampoko on the banks of the Lulonga River. I crossed the river with some of Kabila's soldiers, with whom I talked; one, a warrant officer, gave me 150,000 New Zaires. They had come by boat from Basankusu in the north of Zaire.

On 17 June 1997 we arrived at the Zaire River at 6.30 p.m. We spent the night there, having crossed the Mitole Forest and stayed five days and nights by the water.

In the morning Captain Mubirigi gave the order to cross the river, but four Rwandan women said that they would cross after they saw their husbands, because they didn't know where they were; they were soldiers. Two of the four women were Tutsis, however. The Captain ordered all four of them to be bayoneted and thrown into the river, as was the one-year-old son of one of the Tutsi women.

On 27 June 1997 we arrived in the Congo and on 22 July 1997 we arrived in the Central African Republic.

(Signed) NIYONZIMA NTAGUNGIRA Gérard

Appendix

- (1) Lt. Col. Ndahimana J. M. V.
- (2) Col. Murasamrongo
- (3) Lt. Cdr. Rwamanywa - gutvika amabisi
- (4) Cdr. Kanyamanza André BKV
- (5) Capt. Ntibakunze
- (6) Lt. Cdr. Nubaha
- (7) Major Bizimana Andre
- (8) Major Nzabonimpa Joseph
- (9) Lt. Cdr. Juvenal Bahufite Mugunga
- (10) Major Ntilikani Faustin
- (11) Col. Nyilimanzi
- (12) Lt. Col. Ruhorahoza
- (13) Major Kanyamibwa, pilot who died in camp
- (14) Major Njampame
- (15) Major Kinyoni
- (16) Major Sebahinzi
- (17) Major Nyamuhimba
- (18) Capt. Munyakyanza
- (19) Major Nzuwonemeye
- (20) Major Kalisa
- (21) Major Rusagaliye
- (22) Major Mpiranya Protais
- (23) Major Munyarugerero
- (24) Lt. Col. Munyarugarama
- (25) Major Ngayanberura
- (26) Major Gen. Bizimungu Augustin with Mobutu
- (27) Lt. Col. Gasarabwe Edouard



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13 November 1997

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LETTER DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to bring to your attention a press release issued on 5 November 1997 by His Excellency President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, by which he accepted the Economic Community of West African States six-month plan for Sierra Leone, 23 October 1997 to 22 April 1998.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its attachment could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) James O. C. JONAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Press release dated 5 November 1997 by His Excellency
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on the Economic Community
of West African States six-month plan for Sierra Leone,
23 October 1997 to 22 April 1998

I have now been fully briefed about the recently concluded Conakry Peace Plan for Sierra Leone. I consider it acceptable. On behalf of the people of Sierra Leone and on my own personal behalf, I express my sincere thanks to the Committee of five ECOWAS Foreign Ministers and the Governments they represent for the money, time and effort spent to find a peaceful solution to the present crisis in Sierra Leone. I also take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the entire international community for their immense political, diplomatic and material support to Sierra Leone, and to my Government and people in these difficult times. Sierra Leoneans will continue to depend on this support until there is a final resolution of those problems.

I have also had time to study the document carefully. It is my view that it contains a number of positive elements which will lead to a resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone. My Government on its part will do everything possible to cooperate with ECOWAS and its monitoring organ, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and other organizations such as the United Nations and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees which are to be involved in the implementation of their respective roles within the Peace Plan.

The people of Sierra Leone have suffered enough. My Government is determined to seize the opportunity afforded by this Peace Plan to bring an end to their suffering. That is the reason why I now, by this statement, urge all Sierra Leoneans to embrace the Conakry Peace Plan which takes into account a good part of the Abidjan Peace Accord, and to regard it as an instrument that will lead to sustainable peace, to be followed by the reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and ultimate development and prosperity of our country.



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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions and the statements of its President,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Tajikistan of 4 September 1997 (S/1997/686 and Add.1) and of 5 November 1997 (S/1997/859),

Having considered also the letter of 17 October 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/808),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Tajikistan and to the inviolability of its borders,

Welcoming the progress made by the parties in the implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (S/1997/510) and the effective maintenance of the ceasefire between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO),

Expressing concern that the security situation in Tajikistan remains volatile with, in particular, a high level of violence in the central part of the country, although large parts of the country are relatively calm,

Welcoming the decision of the Commonwealth of Independent States to authorize its Collective Peacekeeping Forces (the CIS Peacekeeping Forces) to assist in providing security for United Nations personnel at the request of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and with the agreement of the parties,

Taking note of the requests of the parties, contained in the General Agreement and in the letter of 27 June 1997 from the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and UTO leader to the Secretary-General (S/1997/508), for the further assistance of the United Nations in implementing the General Agreement, and recognizing that the implementation of this Agreement will require the consistent good faith and constant effort of the parties, as well as the



sustained and vigorous support of the United Nations and the international community,

1. Welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General of 4 September 1997 and of 5 November 1997;
2. Welcomes also the serious efforts made by the Government of Tajikistan and the UTO to carry out their commitments under the General Agreement and the progress achieved in the activities of the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR), the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees, the registration of UTO fighters inside Tajikistan and the repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan;
3. Notes with appreciation the agreement of the parties to form a joint security unit with the task of providing security, including armed escorts, for UNMOT personnel and transports mainly in the central part of the country and calls upon them to establish it without delay;
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expand the size of UNMOT in accordance with his recommendations;
5. Decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT until 15 May 1998;
6. Decides that the mandate of UNMOT shall be as follows:

To use its best efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation and to assist in the implementation of the General Agreement and, to this end, to

- (a) Provide good offices and expert advice as stipulated in the General Agreement;
- (b) Cooperate with the CNR and its subcommissions, and with the Central Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum;
- (c) Participate in the work of the Contact Group of guarantor States and organizations and to serve as its coordinator;
- (d) Investigate reports of ceasefire violations and report on them to the United Nations and the CNR;
- (e) Monitor the assembly of UTO fighters and their reintegration, disarmament and demobilization;
- (f) Assist in the reintegration into governmental power structures or demobilization of ex-combatants;
- (g) Coordinate United Nations assistance to Tajikistan during the transition period;
- (h) Maintain close contacts with the parties, as well as cooperative liaison with the CIS Peacekeeping Forces, the Russian border forces and the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Tajikistan;

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7. Calls upon the parties to cooperate further in ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations, the CIS Peacekeeping Forces, and other international personnel;

8. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to convene in Vienna on 24 and 25 November 1997 a Donor Conference to obtain international support dedicated to the fulfilment of the General Agreement, and encourages Member States and others concerned to respond promptly and generously to ensure that this opportunity is not lost to contribute to the success of the peace process;

9. Further encourages Member States and others concerned to continue assistance to alleviate the urgent humanitarian needs in Tajikistan and to offer support to Tajikistan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of its economy;

10. Welcomes the continued contribution made by the CIS Peacekeeping Forces in assisting the parties in the implementation of the General Agreement in coordination with all concerned;

11. Commends the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the personnel of UNMOT and encourages them to continue assisting the parties in the implementation of the General Agreement;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of all significant developments, in particular regarding the security situation, and also requests him to report within three months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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LETTER DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

This morning, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, saw me prior to his departure. He took the opportunity to convey the position of his Government on the present situation relating to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which I feel I should convey to you. The position is as follows.

The Government of Iraq has taken the decision to expel the United States individuals of UNSCOM. In this regard, Mr. Aziz wished the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to be informed that Iraq's decision had been, and remained, that UNSCOM could continue its normal work with other officials. If UNSCOM wished to send other personnel to conduct its normal work, they would be welcome. If not, and the monitors were withdrawn, the Chairman of UNSCOM would bear the responsibility.

Mr. Aziz assured me that he did not want a confrontation with the Security Council or with UNSCOM. If UNSCOM did not want to escalate the present situation he hoped that it would conduct its work until a solution could be found to the problem through diplomatic means and channels. Iraq hoped to avoid a military confrontation and the activities and flights by U-2 aircraft should be ceased. Mr. Aziz reiterated that Iraq wished to continue contacts, and continue a dialogue to find a suitable solution to the situation.

You might wish to share this information with the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN





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LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF
THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 9 (b) (i) OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

The Security Council takes note of your letter of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/883), in which you informed it that, as a result of the Government of Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolution 1137 (1997), you have decided to withdraw temporarily from Iraq the majority of UNSCOM personnel.

In view of this development with regard to activities of UNSCOM in the territory of Iraq, we welcome your intention to present to the Council an assessment of the ability of UNSOM, in the current circumstances, to perform its mandate, including your views on the need for an emergency meeting of the Special Commission.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
President of the Security Council



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(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN



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LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 10 November 1997 (S/1997/890), concerning your decision to appoint Mr. Matthew Nimetz (United States of America) as Deputy to your Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
President of the Security Council

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 13 November 1997 from the Permanent Representative of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 10 November 1997, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. CELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



ANNEX

Letter dated 10 November 1997 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the statements made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the meetings of the Third Committee held on 27 October and 4 November 1997 under agenda items 103, 104 and 107 (entitled "Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice", "International Drug Control" and "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons and humanitarian questions", respectively). These statements contain allegations that grossly distort the realities of Cyprus and demonstrate yet again that the Greek Cypriot side is more interested in political posturing than the negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Since the Turkish Cypriot side is being denied its right of say in the said Committee, I am compelled to respond to these allegations in writing.

The Greek Cypriot representative, in a vain attempt to absolve the Greek Cypriot side from the responsibility of creating and perpetuating the conflict on the island, once again refers to Northern Cyprus, the homeland of the Turkish Cypriot people, as an area under "occupation" or "invasion". I wish to remind the Greek Cypriot representative that the only occupation in Cyprus is the 34-year-old usurpation and continued occupation by the Greek Cypriot side of the seat of government of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus established under the 1960 treaties.

Much to the contrary of the charges contained in the aforesaid statements by the Greek Cypriot representative, the Cyprus question has not come about as a result of the legitimate Turkish intervention of 1974, but by the Greek Cypriot conspiracy and overt acts of violence during the period from 1963 to 1974 aimed at converting the bi-communal partnership State of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot one. This is admitted by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, in his memoirs entitled Cyprus: My Deposition, in the following words: "... the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot State, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority" (vol. 3, p. 105).

As regards the question of displaced persons, it should be mentioned that nearly four fifths of the Turkish Cypriot population have been rendered refugees or have become displaced persons since 1963, some of them several times over, as a result of the Greek Cypriot side's attempts to annex Cyprus to Greece. It should be recalled that the issue of displaced persons was fundamentally settled between the two sides through the third Vienna agreement of 2 August 1975, whereby the two sides formally agreed to exchange populations. The agreement was implemented under the supervision of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in September 1975, paving the way for bi-zonal, bi-communal settlement of the Cyprus issue. (See S/11789 of 5 August 1975 and S/11789/Add.1 of 10 September 1975.)

A natural consequence of the population exchange agreement has been the establishment of parameters within which reciprocal property claims by both sides can be settled, as outlined in the United Nations set of ideas of 1992 in

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which a global solution to this issue is envisaged through property exchange and/or compensation. The exploitation of this issue by the Greek Cypriot side for propaganda purposes is clearly aimed at prejudicing a bi-zonal settlement, which has been universally accepted as a fair and realistic approach. Its attempt, on the other hand, to impute responsibility to Turkey on this matter by citing a short-sighted, politically inclined court decision, which fails to take into account the bi-zonal, bi-communal framework for a solution, has similar ulterior motives. By way of emphasis, it should be reiterated that Turkey's role in Cyprus is limited to providing security guarantees to the Turkish Cypriots and preventing the repetition of Greek Cypriot aggression against them.

It is unfortunate that the Greek Cypriot side should continue to resort to such harmful propaganda in order to mislead the international community about the Cyprus question in general, as well as the various issues pertaining to it. This can only be interpreted as another demonstration of the Greek Cypriot side's insincerity about a bi-zonal settlement and of its strategy of buying time until it secures unilateral European Union membership in the name of "Cyprus", in complete disregard of international treaties on Cyprus and the established parameters for a comprehensive settlement.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus



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LETTER DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated
12 November 1997, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the
Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Letter dated 12 November 1997 from the Secretary-General of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the
Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the tenth monthly report on Stabilization Force operations. I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Tenth monthly report to the United Nations Security Council
on SFOR operations

SFOR operations

1. Approximately 35,000 troops are currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the NATO nations and from 20 non-NATO countries. Over the reporting period (21 September-20 October), the number of troops in theatre decreased owing to the return of the reinforcements previously deployed in support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the conduct of the municipal elections which took place on 13 and 14 September.
2. Over the reporting period, SFOR continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. A total of 2,550 sorties were flown by combat aircraft, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying 99 hours.
3. Support continues to be provided to the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), with SFOR maintaining its regular, coordinated training missions over Eastern Slavonia in order to exercise plans to conduct close air support if necessary.
4. Political unrest continues in the Republika Srpska, and, over the reporting period, tensions have risen with respect to the media there. On 1 October, at the request of the High Representative, and as a result of persistent biased and distorted broadcasting by Pale Serb Radio Television (SRT), in particular the distortion of the press conference with Judge Louise Arbour, SFOR secured the SRT transmitters at Udrigovo and Duga Nijva in Multi-National Division North and at Mount Trebevic and Leotar in Multi-National Division South-East, with the aim of preventing Pale SRT from broadcasting in contravention of the Peace Agreement, and the Sintra Declaration. SFOR's securing of the towers was accomplished without incident. In cooperation with the Banja Luka-based SRT authorities, SRT transmissions were re-established from the Banja Luka SRT studios.
5. On 18 October, in response to unauthorized pro-Pale SRT television transmissions, first monitored late on 16 October, SFOR troops in Multi-National Division North mounted operations to inspect the SRT Veliki Zep tower to determine if it had been the source of the unauthorized transmissions. During the course of the inspection, it was discovered that transmitting and receiving equipment had recently been removed from the tower, rendering it non-operational, and also disabling the south-eastern section of the SRT broadcasting network, including transmissions from Trebevic and Leotar towers. A platoon from Multi-National Division North secured Veliki Zep tower. In conjunction with the Office of the High Representative, work is in hand to restore the south-eastern section of the SRT broadcasting network to normal operation. SFOR forces continue to secure the television towers at Udrigovo, Duga Nijva, Mount Trebevic, Leotar and Veliki Zep.

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6. Throughout the Federation, the political and security climate continued to improve. Nevertheless, there were several serious incidents over the reporting period, including a car bomb explosion in Mostar and an explosion which destroyed a mosque in Tomislavgrad. In early October, inflammatory reports were broadcast by Mostar radio, accusing SFOR and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of mistreating a local Bosnian Croat official and engaging in behaviour likely to result in further violence. OSCE called for a retraction of the broadcasts.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

7. The parties remain generally compliant with most military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace across the whole area of operations, and were highly cooperative during the recent election period.

8. With respect to the police restructuring process, the Federation is fully engaged with the programme initiated by IPTF, and its police forces are now conforming to internationally recognized standards. The target size for the Federation police force is 11,500 - to date, 6,711 policemen have been fully certified and 2,985 temporarily. Five of the 10 Federation cantons have completed the IPTF certification process.

9. Although local police restructuring is progressing more slowly in the Republika Srpska, an agreement was reached between the Republika Srpska authorities and IPTF on 26 September to begin the restructuring process there immediately and setting the size of the Republika Srpska police at 8,500 officers. On 13 October, Ambassador Farrand, the Brcko Supervisor, issued a supervisory order requiring the establishment of a multi-ethnic police force in Brcko by 31 December 1997.

10. While the Republika Srpska local police certification and training programme is encouraging, the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade, under the command of General Saric, is still not in full compliance with annex IA of the Peace Agreement and with the supplementary instructions to the parties issued by the SFOR Commander on 15 August. This Brigade comprises five units, and currently numbers 954 men in total. The units are located in Pale, Sekovici, Bijeljina, Doboj and Tjentiste, with Brigade headquarters and two weapons-storage sites located in Janja. In addition, there are two training centres at Bratunac and Janja. There are two outstanding issues of non-compliance: first, an overall general failure on the part of each Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade unit to provide monthly duty rosters, and the non-submission of a personnel list by a unit at Bratunac. A further issue which remains unresolved is President Krajisnik's failure to reply personally to the SFOR Commander's letter of 24 September requiring an explanation of the role of the Specialist Police in the Banja Luka events of 8 and 9 September (see S/1997/794, annex, appendix, para. 7). In the light of this non-compliance, the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade as a whole remains subject to a training and movement ban and continues to be closely monitored by SFOR. SFOR will continue to require all units to comply fully with the relevant instructions before permitting any modification of these present restrictions. In an effort to ensure such compliance, SFOR has established links with each unit and has addressed a letter to the Republika Srpska Minister of the Interior outlining the remaining non-compliance issues.

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11. During the reporting period, SFOR inspected 373 military weapons storage sites: 119 Bosniac; 127 Bosnian Croat; and 127 Bosnian Serb. A number of minor discrepancies were discovered, and the following weapons confiscated: from the Bosniacs, 5 rocket-propelled grenades, 1 rifle grenade, 24 hand grenades and 2 x 60 mm mortar rounds; from the Bosnian Croats, 6 long-barrelled weapons, 4 AK 47 rifles, 27 rifle grenades, 100 PMR1 mines, and 83 x 7.62 rounds of ammunition; and from the Bosnian Serbs, 2 lorry-loads of old rifles, pistols and ammunition.

12. SFOR continues to support the IPTF inspections of civilian police stations. Over the reporting period, a total of 236 civil police stations were inspected, 71 of which (36 Federation and 35 Republika Srpska) revealed discrepancies, and the following weapons confiscated: from the Federation, 611 grenades, 3 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-tank mine, 1,974 long-barrelled weapons and 68 rifles; and from the Republika Srpska, 48 grenades, 8 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-tank mine, 51 long-barrelled weapons, 16 rifles and 5 pistols. In addition, SFOR confiscated 25 mortar rounds and 271,405 small-arm rounds. In accordance with SFOR policy, after a period of time to allow for appeals, all these confiscated weapons will be destroyed.

13. Over the reporting period, no illegal checkpoints were dismantled. The SFOR/IPTF checkpoint policy has improved freedom of movement over the entire area of operations, and the number of requests for authorization to set up checkpoints has steadily decreased, dropping from 1,049 a week at the beginning of July to 96 requests a week by the end of September.

14. Movements of displaced persons and refugees were affected by the announcement of the municipal election results, with refugees drawn to communities which they view as more hospitable, based on the election results and the degree to which their implementation is proceeding. Much of this movement has taken place across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and SFOR is continuing closely to monitor the most affected areas. SFOR is also continuing to work with the Entities on cross-Inter-Entity Boundary Line transportation and, in conjunction with the United States Agency for International Development, has repaired the Tuzla-Brcko railway line in order to enhance freedom of movement.

15. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored a total of 438 training and movement activities: 119 by the Bosniacs; 46 by the Bosnian Croats; and 273 by the Bosnian Serbs. There are currently two training and movement bans in effect, both in the Multi-National Division South-East - one on the 7th Bosnian Serb Army Corps, and the second on the 820th Bosniac Army Brigade.

16. During the reporting period, Entity personnel, under SFOR supervision, removed 1,818 explosive devices from a total of 325 mined areas: 229 anti-tank mines; 1,539 anti-personnel mines, and 50 items of unexploded ordnance. A ban was placed on the movement and training of the 3rd VRS corps by Multi-National Division North from 22 September to 21 October, with the only exceptions being activities to execute the counter-mine campaign, OSCE arms reductions, and site reductions. A complete training ban which had originally been placed on the 5th VRS corps from 22 September to 21 October was lifted on 10 October because of the corps' full cooperation with SFOR in its demining programme.

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17. The agreement reached by the parties at the 19 August Inter-Entity Boundary Line subcommission meeting and reflected in last month's report (S/1997/794, annex, appendix, para. 17) was not ratified, with the result that the exchange of the Republika Srpska village of Dobocani for the Federation village of Koprivna did not take place. Separate meetings with the Federation and Republika Srpska officials have taken place in an attempt to move this issue forward.

Cooperation with international organizations

18. Within its capabilities, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre and support the work of IPITF, as noted above, the Office of the High Representative, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and OSCE.

19. Since the beginning of the political struggle within the Republika Srpska in early July, SFOR has supported the development of an Office of the High Representative and OSCE media initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has involved direct support for the completion of the successful Free Elections Radio Network (FERIR) and the development of the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), with SFOR providing engineering, communications and logistics support. In close liaison with the Office of the High Representative, a policy of opening up the media within Bosnia and Herzegovina has been pursued. This has included SFOR working within the various media advisory working groups such as the Media Experts Commission and the newly created Media Standards Advisory Group. SFOR has also helped staff the Office of the High Representative Media Restructuring Plan and encouraged the technical and financial support that will be required to fund this project.

20. SFOR also continues to work with the Office of the High Representative on the issue of opening up regional airports, notably by ensuring that there are no technical grounds to preclude the opening of the Tuzla, Mostar and Banja Luka airports to civilian traffic.

21. SFOR is fully participating in the OSCE Election Results Implementation Committees, at national and regional levels. These Committees will monitor the installation of elected candidates and will coordinate responses to installation problems. SFOR is also developing a public information campaign in consultation with OSCE, to assist in the election implementation process.

22. With the announcement of Republika Srpska Assembly elections on 23 November, SFOR has begun initial planning for providing logistics and area-security support to OSCE. SFOR also continues to provide personnel to the Joint SFOR/OSCE Elections Operations Centre in preparation for these elections.

23. With respect to arms control, all those parties with weapons still to be reduced reported that they expected to meet the 31 October deadline. Cooperation in the period leading to the end of phase II has been excellent, except for the boycott by the Republika Srpska of the Subregional Consultative Commission meeting in early September. Overall, arms control is progressing in a highly satisfactory manner.

Outlook

24. SFOR has now begun initial planning, in close coordination with OSCE, for the Republika Srpska Assembly elections, scheduled for 23 November. SFOR support will be similar to that provided for the municipal elections, although on a smaller scale, owing to the smaller number of polling stations.



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THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/195 B of 17 December 1996, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its fifty-second session on the progress made in the implementation of that resolution. In the same resolution, the Assembly had also requested the Secretary-General to report to it every three months on the progress of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA). Three progress reports were submitted: the first on 16 March 1997 (A/51/838-S/1997/240 and Corr.1), the second on 16 June 1997 (A/51/929-S/1997/482) and the third on 17 September 1997 (A/52/358-S/1997/719).

2. The present report is also intended to fulfil the request of the Security Council, in resolution 1076 (1996) of 22 October 1996, to be kept regularly informed of the main developments in Afghanistan. The report describes the main events which have taken place in Afghanistan since the adoption of resolution 51/195 B, including the major military and political developments and the activities of the Special Mission. It also draws attention to activities in New York, including the appointment of a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and the convening of the third meeting of countries with influence in Afghanistan.

3. In October 1997, Norbert Heinrich Holl, Head of UNSMA, expressed to me his intention to resign at the end of 1997, when his contract expires. I accepted his resignation with deep regret. I should like to express my gratitude to Mr. Holl, who has worked devotedly since July 1996 under extremely difficult circumstances and during a period of great upheaval in Afghanistan to promote national reconciliation and a durable political settlement in that country.



II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

A. Military situation

4. The military balance between the Afghan warring factions see-sawed wildly in 1997. The factions fought hard for control of northern Afghanistan and the northern approaches to Kabul. However, despite the expenditure of large quantities of externally supplied ammunition and equipment, and the loss of many lives and the displacement of civilian populations, neither side succeeded in recording sizeable gains of territory or significant political advantage. By early November 1997, the predominantly Pushtun Taliban continued to hold approximately two thirds of the country but had not been able to capture the territories in the north, which are largely populated by the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups.

5. The Afghan antagonists were the Taliban and the five-party Northern Alliance which is formally known as the Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. The Taliban continued to control most provinces in the south, south-west and south-east, including Kabul and the cities of Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad. The Northern Alliance, which operated from the provincial capitals of Mazar-i-Sharif, Bamyan, Taloqan and Maimana, was in control of the provinces in northern and central Afghanistan. The Alliance at present comprises the Jamiat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and his chief military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud; the Hezb-i-Wahdat led by Karim Khalili; the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIMA), led by General Rashid Dostum and General Abdul Malik; the Harakat-i-Islami, led by Sheik Asef Mohseini; and the breakaway faction of the Hezb-i-Wahdat, led by Mohammed Akbari.

6. In January 1997, the Taliban launched a large-scale offensive against the Northern Alliance, sweeping through most of the positions held to the north of Kabul by the Alliance. The strategic positions which fell to the Taliban included Bagram airbase and Charikar, the provincial capital of Parwan, as well as Jabal-os-Saraj and Gulbahar. The Taliban also advanced along the Ghorband valley towards the central province of Bamyan and, on 2 February, occupied Sheik Ali in Parwan province, 20 kilometres east of Shebar pass which commands access to Bamyan and to the northern territories controlled by General Dostum.

7. The Northern Alliance was dealt a further blow on 19 May when General Malik, a key NIMA commander, staged what at the time appeared to be a pro-Taliban revolt against General Dostum. General Malik took control of Mazar-i-Sharif on 24 May, forcing General Dostum to flee the country and take refuge in Turkey. Seizing the opportunity, the Taliban forces, estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000, infiltrated areas north of the Hindu Kush for the first time. Some 3,000 troops proceeded to Mazar, and others went to Kunduz and Takhar provinces. A Taliban delegation, led by Mullah Mohammad Ghaus, flew into Mazar-i-Sharif on 27 May for talks with General Malik.

8. The situation changed on 27 May when General Malik, apparently alarmed by the Taliban's rush to disarm his troops and those of the Hezb-i-Wahdat, decided to change sides again and to attack the Taliban forces. The Taliban forces, outnumbered and outgunned in a place far from their own sphere of influence, withdrew from Mazar on 28 May after suffering serious losses. Capitalizing on

the Taliban's setback, Commander Massoud broke out of the Panjsher valley and cut off the northern side of the Salang tunnel on 28 May. The Massoud forces retook Gulbahar and Jabal-os-Sijaji, located at the southern end of the Salang pass, effectively trapping an estimated 2,000 Taliban forces north of the Hindu Kush. In July, Massoud's forces recaptured Charikar and Bagram airbase, north of Kabul. The forces eventually reached to within 20 to 25 kilometres north of Kabul, putting the capital within range of artillery and rocket fire for the first time since the autumn of 1996. During the fighting in July and August, Kabul came under fire frequently from rocket, artillery and aerial bombing attacks which killed and injured a number of civilians.

9. Severe fighting broke out again in September when the Taliban, supported by defections of local Pushtun commanders, renewed their attempt to take Mazar-i-Sharif. However, like their first attempt in May, the Taliban's initial gains were wiped out by counter-attacks and defections from the Taliban side. Both military and civilian casualties were high, with an estimated 2,000 Taliban troops either killed or captured since May. In the fighting east of Mazar, both sides overran a refugee camp of some 7,000 displaced Tajik nationals, causing several deaths and injuries and creating a situation of near panic among the refugees. Fighting continued for control of the northern city of Kunduz, which has been in the hands of the Taliban or pro-Taliban independent commanders since May 1997.

10. In the central region, sporadic fighting continued between the Taliban and Hezb-i-Wahdat faction. Taliban aircraft attacked Bamyan several times in July and August. In this connection, I should like to draw the special attention of the international community to the fact that the continued fighting in Afghanistan has had devastating effects not only on its people but also on its vast reservoir of rich cultural heritage. A case in point was the recent incident in which a bomb blast near the larger of the two great Buddha statues in Bamyan caused some damage to the head of the statue.

11. In the west, fighting occurred in the Morghab river area in Badghis province but with little change in frontline positions. The Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad regions were generally calm.

B. Political situation

12. As the fighting continued, the political situation in Afghanistan remained deadlocked. The deepening division of the country along ethnic lines, reinforced by external military and political support, continued to inhibit efforts to engender political dialogue among the factions. Throughout 1997, neither the Taliban nor its rivals appear to have given serious consideration to a political, as opposed to a military, solution to the conflict.

13. An unsettled leadership problem within the Northern Alliance also affected the political environment. Infighting was most pronounced in the predominantly Uzbek Jumbish movement, whose leader, General Dostum, was forced into exile in Turkey for four months by his rival, General Malik, after the latter's short-lived defection to the Taliban in May. While General Malik subsequently turned against the Taliban and helped to drive its forces out of Mazar, the return of

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General Dostum to Afghanistan on 12 September led to further political uncertainty in the north. Adding to the complex leadership problem was the death of newly designated Prime Minister Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai in an aircraft accident at Bamyán airport in August.

14. The humanitarian and political activities of the United Nations in the Mazar-i-Sharif area were seriously disrupted by the renewed fighting and subsequent chaos, including explicit threats to United Nations personnel and the repeated looting of United Nations offices and equipment. At one point, some Afghan officials in Mazar falsely accused United Nations personnel of collaborating with the Taliban in directing its aerial attacks on the city and threatened them with retribution. Looted (and repainted) United Nations vehicles are brazenly used by local factions. I am extremely concerned by all of this, as well as by the refusal of General Malik to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the Taliban prisoners captured in May, a state of affairs that, as he has been informed on many occasions, is completely unacceptable to the United Nations and the international community at large.

15. Of similar concern is the Taliban's refusal to start negotiations with the Northern Alliance as a whole without preconditions, as well as its social and administrative practices. The mistreatment of girls and women, such as the denial of their rights to employment, health care and education, is especially worrying. Furthermore, Afghanistan has become the world's largest producer of heroin, with the vast majority of the poppies used for that purpose cultivated in areas controlled by the Taliban. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme recently announced that the Taliban had agreed to work out ways and means to eliminate poppy cultivation. I sincerely hope that the Taliban will ensure that the agreement is implemented faithfully and effectively.

16. The Taliban have made new efforts during 1997 to gain international recognition and support. Taliban representatives undertook a series of missions abroad, in particular to East Asia, the Gulf region and the United States of America. While the Governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in May, other Governments have withheld their decision to extend de jure recognition.

17. Member States, in particular the countries surrounding Afghanistan, continue to express concern and frustration about the continuing civil war. Of particular concern to them are the negative implications of prolonged warfare and the imposition of an ultra-orthodox Islamic State on their borders. Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey were held in the Islamic Republic of Iran in early January, followed by a meeting of the Afghan parties on 25 and 26 January. The Taliban, however, refused to attend the meeting in Tehran. The Defence Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan met in Tashkent on 24 and 25 February and reaffirmed their commitment jointly to defend their borders. The Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran made efforts throughout the year to promote a negotiated settlement to the conflict through an intra-Afghan dialogue. None of those efforts, however, was

successful in getting talks started, in large part because the two countries were not seen by one or the other of the Afghan factions as impartial mediators.

18. Foreign military support to the two sides continued unabated throughout 1997. Reliable eyewitnesses reported many sorties of military deliveries in unmarked aircraft to bases of the Northern Alliance, as well as numerous deliveries by truck caravans of arms, ammunition and fuel to Taliban-controlled territory. United Nations employees also reported an encounter with an unidentified foreign military training unit of several hundred persons near Kabul. Such blatant violations of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which call for a halt to foreign military intervention seriously undermine United Nations peacemaking efforts and serve to prolong the Afghan conflict. They also raised suspicions and worsened relations among the countries in the region.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

19. Despite the unfavourable climate for negotiations during most of 1997, UNSMA has persisted in its peacemaking efforts. From 13 to 15 January, the Head of UNSMA convened an intra-Afghan working group in Islamabad by inviting representatives of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to participate. The group discussed the modalities for establishing a ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners and steps towards a more durable peace. The working group met again in Islamabad, from 24 to 26 February, to exchange views in greater depth on those subjects and to review more detailed proposals for confidence-building measures and a draft ceasefire agreement. The participants agreed to refer those issues for decision at a higher level meeting. However, owing to the posing of numerous preconditions, the faction leaders were unable to reach agreement on a formula for holding direct talks.

20. Despite the setback to this initiative, UNSMA continued to maintain contact with all of the Afghan factions and to press them once again to define their terms for negotiation. By early May, however, fighting had escalated once more in central and western Afghanistan, spreading to the Northern Alliance stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif. The Mission continued to exploit new opportunities for negotiation during relative lulls in the fighting in June and early July. Following the capture of several high-ranking Taliban officials and a large number of troops in northern Afghanistan in late May, the Head of UNSMA again initiated efforts to convene a meeting at a neutral site outside Afghanistan, with a single representative from each of the two opposing groups. Taliban representatives, however, refused to agree to any talks until their leaders and all of their prisoners were released, a condition unacceptable to the Northern Alliance which set its own precondition, the demilitarization of Kabul.

21. While both sides agreed in principle on the necessity of a negotiated settlement, neither would agree to unconditional talks. The two sides also continued the familiar practice of accusing each other of receiving military support from foreign countries, while categorically denying their own responsibilities for accepting external support. During a second round of meetings with the Head of UNSMA, the Northern Alliance dropped its insistence on

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the prior demilitarization of Kabul, but the Taliban refused to drop its insistence on the prior release of its prisoners captured by the Alliance. As military operations escalated in the northern region during September and October, it was once again clear that both sides preferred to pursue an elusive military "victory" over their adversaries.

22. Throughout 1997, UNSMA remained in close touch with officials and diplomats in Islamabad, notably the envoys of the group of 21 countries with influence in Afghanistan and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Head of UNSMA also travelled within the region and beyond to exchange views with a wide range of governmental officials and other parties interested in Afghanistan. From 21 to 26 January, he held consultations on the Afghan situation in Tashkent, Ashkabad and Tehran with the Presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and with Iranian leaders. He held further talks from 18 to 27 June with officials in Tashkent, Moscow, Washington, D.C., Paris, Bonn and Rome. In Rome, he also consulted former King Zahir Shah and his aides. In meetings with Pakistani officials in Islamabad, the Head of UNSMA stressed that national reconciliation and a durable political settlement could only be achieved with the support and cooperation of the neighbouring States and the major powers.

23. Peace in Afghanistan, if it is to be a durable peace, must also be founded on the alleviation of the Afghan people's most pressing social and economic problems. It is for this reason that the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, is currently formulating a strategic framework for Afghanistan, an initiative which is referred in the report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance to Afghanistan (A/52/536). The strategic framework for Afghanistan proposes a more holistic approach by the international community, whereby the political efforts of the United Nations inform, and are informed by, the international community's social, economic and humanitarian priorities. In this connection, I look forward to a greater degree of integration of the activities of UNSMA and the other United Nations agencies and programmes working for the Afghan people.

IV. ACTIVITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Appointment of the Special Envoy

24. In July 1997, I decided to appoint Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria, as my Special Envoy for Afghanistan. The activities of the Special Envoy were to be distinguished from those of UNSMA, the mandate of which was specifically defined by the General Assembly in resolution 51/195 B. I asked the Special Envoy to conduct a mission to consult the interested and relevant countries and parties, and then to submit to me his findings on their positions, as well as his recommendations, as part of a comprehensive review of United Nations peacemaking activities in Afghanistan.

25. In New York, the Special Envoy met a number of permanent representatives to the United Nations, as well as representatives of various Afghan parties who were present. In early August, he visited Washington for extensive talks with senior officials of the State Department of the United States of America and the diplomats of various countries stationed in that city.

26. From 14 August to 23 September, the Special Envoy undertook a 13-nation tour of Afghanistan, France, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uzbekistan

27. The Special Envoy visited three Afghan cities: Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamyan. In Kandahar, he met Mullah Jalil, Acting Taliban Foreign Minister; Mullah Mohammad Hassan, Deputy Head of the Taliban Supreme Shura in Kabul; and Mullah Mohammad Hassan, Governor of Kandahar. In Mazar-i-Sharif, he met General Abdul Malik, leader of NIMA; Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, the newly appointed Prime Minister of the Northern Alliance; and representatives of the Jamiat-i-Islami, the Harakat-i-Islami, and the breakaway faction of the Hezb-i-Wahdat, led by Mr. Akbari. The Head of UNSMA, accompanied the Special Envoy to all of the meetings held in Afghanistan.

28. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Special Envoy was received with interest and warm hospitality. In all five of the six immediate neighbours of Afghanistan that he visited, he was received by their respective Heads of State as well as the Foreign Ministers. In the Russian Federation, the Special Envoy met Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posuvaluk and other senior officials. He was received in Saudi Arabia by King Fahd, Crown Prince Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal, as well as by the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In India, he was received by Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, Minister of State for External Affairs Shri Salim I. Shervani and other senior officials. In Japan, he was received by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi. The Special Envoy met senior officials of the British and French Foreign Ministries in London and Paris, and he was received by former King Zahir Shah in Rome.

29. After his return to New York on 23 September, the Special Envoy continued consultations with representatives of the Afghan parties and the countries concerned, including the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, who were participating in the general debate of the General Assembly. On 30 September, he briefed the Security Council on his mission.

B. Meeting of States with influence in Afghanistan

30. On 1 October, I convened the third meeting of Member States with influence in Afghanistan in New York, using the formula that had been adopted for the meetings held on 18 November 1996 and 16 April 1997. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs chaired the meeting, in which the following member States participated: China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan. The Organization of the Islamic Conference also participated in the meeting. The Special Envoy and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme briefed the meeting on their respective missions.

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31. The delegations shared the view that the situation in Afghanistan remained volatile and carried serious implications for regional peace and stability. Many of them emphasized the importance of persistent efforts by the international community to achieve a political settlement which, they insisted, should not be given up just because conditions were difficult. The delegations expressed the belief that there could be no solution based on the dominance of any one ethnic group, and that there was a need for a broad-based government in Afghanistan that reflected the views of all segments of society. All delegations expressed full support for United Nations efforts in Afghanistan, in particular the peacemaking activities led by UNSMA. They were of the view that the United Nations should play the central role in peacemaking in Afghanistan, as a neutral and impartial mediator.
32. Many delegations stressed the need for more cooperation and coordination among Member States, in particular those in the region, in facilitating peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan. There was widespread agreement on the importance of addressing the question of foreign interference, especially the seemingly unabated supply of arms to the factions, as one of the key factors contributing to the continued fighting in Afghanistan.
33. The delegations emphasized that the Afghans needed to demonstrate a genuine political will to move towards national reconciliation. A number of suggestions were made in support of a direct dialogue between the warring parties. Several delegations offered specific venues for an intra-Afghan dialogue or for an international conference, including Bishkek and Tokyo.
34. Great concern was expressed by delegations about Afghanistan's contribution to the international drug trade and the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, not least the heavy burden placed upon neighbouring countries by the influx of refugees. Special attention was drawn to the serious human rights violations, in particular the treatment of girls and women. Many delegations spoke of the appalling cost of landmines in terms of human suffering and of the need to do more to clear them. There was a keen awareness among delegations of the need for the international community to be ready to help rebuild Afghanistan as soon as conditions permit. It was considered that United Nations peacemaking activities should be closely coordinated with its humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities.
35. Following the meeting, the Special Envoy and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs convened a series of informal, small gatherings in New York involving representatives of the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and other countries concerned. To date, there have been three meetings of a group of eight countries, comprising China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States of America and Uzbekistan. The purpose was to provide those countries with an opportunity to meet in small groups for a frank exchange of views on the external aspects of the Afghan question. The representatives discussed ways to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table and to curb the flow of arms into Afghanistan effectively and fairly.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

36. Afghanistan, which was once a flashpoint of super-Power rivalry, has since become a typical post-cold war regional and ethnic conflict, where the major Powers no longer see a strategic incentive to get involved. It has also become a place where even responsible local political authorities, let alone a central government, have virtually ceased to exist. Herein lies much of the explanation why repeated international attempts to bring peace to the country have not borne fruit.

37. Since the early 1990s, the Afghan factions and warlords have failed to show the will to rise above their narrow factional interests and to start working together for national reconciliation. The United Nations successfully mediated the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan in the late 1980s. But, although the Najibullah regime was ready to hand over power to a broad-based transition mechanism, the Mujahideen parties were unable to agree among themselves on how to form such a mechanism. Their disagreements escalated to the point where Kabul was plunged into chaos and bloodshed once the Najibullah regime collapsed in April 1992. Since that time, the situation has only become worse.

38. Even today, the Afghan parties seem determined to go on fighting, while outside Powers continue to provide material, financial and other support to their respective clients inside Afghanistan. Meanwhile, although those major Powers that have potential influence in Afghanistan have recently started to show interest, they have yet to demonstrate the necessary degree of determination to move the situation forward.

39. In these circumstances, it is illusory to think that peace can be achieved. How can peace be imposed on faction leaders who are determined to fight it out to the finish and who receive seemingly unlimited supplies of arms from outside sponsors? It is this continued support from some outside Powers - combined with the apathy of the others who are not directly involved - which has strengthened the belief among the warlords and parties in Afghanistan that they can achieve their political, religious and social goals by force.

Responsibility of the Afghans

40. The Afghans, perhaps, understandably, are reluctant to accept responsibility for the repeated failures to put an end to their conflict. Nevertheless, the Afghan people cannot just simply shift all responsibilities for the tragedy that has befallen their country onto others. Even if they receive help from outside, it is the Afghans themselves who are fighting one another. Peace will become possible when - and only when - they truly desire it and start to work seriously for it.

41. Much to my regret, the Afghan factions have so far failed to prove that they are willing to lay down their arms and cooperate with the United Nations for peace. To be sure, every side proclaims its readiness to work with the United Nations and accuses the other party or parties of bearing alone the responsibility for the continued fighting. However, at any given time there has always been at least one party that has thought it could achieve military

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victory over its opponents and that, consequently, has rebuffed efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and only shown a willingness to compromise once the military situation has been reversed and it feels under threat. At the same time, there always exist spoilers inside and outside the country who are much better off with the continuation of the problem than they would be with the solution, a classic situation in failed States where warlords, smugglers, terrorists, drug dealers and others thrive amid the conflict and would only lose out with the return of peace, law and order.

Foreign interference

42. A similar situation prevails with the main foreign providers of support to the Afghan warring parties. They all enthusiastically proclaim their support to the United Nations peacemaking efforts but at the same time continue to fan the conflict by pouring in arms, money and other supplies to their preferred Afghan factions. These countries unanimously denounce "foreign interference", but are quick to add that arms are delivered only to "the other side".

43. These external players may have their own reasons for continuing to support their respective Afghan clients, but they must be held responsible for exacerbating the bloody conflict in Afghanistan. They must also be held accountable for building a fire which, they should be aware, is unlikely to remain indefinitely confined to Afghanistan. Indeed, that fire is already spreading beyond the borders of Afghanistan, posing a serious threat to the region and beyond in the shape of terrorism, banditry, narcotics trafficking, refugee flows, and increasing ethnic and sectarian tension.

44. The supply of arms and other materials from outside provides the essential wherewithal for the continued fighting in Afghanistan. It is apparent, in the light of the evidence collected so far, that large quantities of war-making materials are entering Afghanistan. It is hard to accept the argument that the Afghan warring factions are able to sustain the current level of fighting using only "those weapons and ammunition left by the Soviet troops". Neither is it credible that, with their limited financial capacity, those Afghan factions could afford to procure massive amounts of weapons on the black market and smuggle them into Afghanistan on their own.

International framework for settlement of the conflict

45. The unabated supply of arms, and the divergence of ways in which the countries concerned seem to be dealing with the conflict, lead me to believe that a solid international framework must be established in order to address the external aspects of the Afghan question. Such a framework would provide the neighbours of Afghanistan and other countries with an opportunity to discuss the question of foreign interference in a coherent manner. The main objective would be to debate how those countries could help the United Nations bring the Afghan parties to the negotiating table, including effective and fair ways to curb the flow of arms and other war-making materials into Afghanistan. Such countries should also find a way to speak unanimously by coordinating their individual peace initiatives through the United Nations. Only in this way would they send a message to the Afghans that the international community meant to achieve peace

in Afghanistan and that the warring factions could no longer count on outside support.

46. One of the ways to curb the flow of arms into Afghanistan would be the imposition of an effective arms embargo. Although such an embargo should not become an end in itself, it is necessary for the United Nations and Member States to undertake preliminary studies on how a mandatory arms embargo could be implemented in a fair and verifiable manner. If the cost estimates for such an embargo proved to be too high, other ways would need to be found to end, or at least significantly reduce, the supply of arms and other materials to the warring factions. One possibility would be for the countries concerned to take voluntary, unilateral but concerted actions by themselves to stop, to the degree possible, the supply of a designated list of goods to Afghanistan. This, of course, would also need to be done in a manner that did not provide advantage to any group.

47. The meetings held in New York of countries with influence in Afghanistan ("the Group of 21"), as well as those of the immediate neighbours and other countries ("the Group of Eight"), are part of my efforts in this direction. With the participation of my Special Envoy, I shall continue to convene informal meetings involving representatives of the neighbours of Afghanistan and other countries with influence in Afghanistan. The composition and the number of such groupings will remain flexible.

48. Furthermore, I am looking forward to attending the OIC summit, which will be held in Tehran from 9 to 11 December. I very much hope that OIC and its members will use this opportunity to adopt unanimously a strong decision in favour of peace in Afghanistan.

Intra-Afghan talks

49. Parallel to this, I intend to maintain through UNSMA and at United Nations Headquarters close contact with the warring parties, as well as with other influential Afghan individuals and organizations, with a view to preparing the ground for an intra-Afghan dialogue. Such a dialogue, if realized, should focus at first on a ceasefire, to be followed by political negotiations leading to the establishment of a broad-based representative government. It goes without saying that, for such a government to be acceptable, it should reflect the interests of all the major social, political and religious segments of the country. I take note in this context that several Member States have offered to host such a dialogue.

50. It is hoped that a ceasefire and the beginning of a dialogue - or even the mere prospects for one - would serve to create its own momentum and, after some time, make it difficult for anyone to resume fighting. It is also hoped that the ceasefire and talks would give a boost to the efforts of some Afghan groups and individuals to mobilize Afghan public opinion in favour of peace.

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Activities of UNOSMA

51. UNOSMA will continue to play the primary role in conducting the United Nations peacemaking activities in Afghanistan. I believe that the current structure, composition and strength of UNOSMA should be maintained for the time being. This does not exclude the possibility that, should a ceasefire and other measures be agreed, additional personnel might be required. Nor does it prejudice the issue referred to in paragraph 56 below.

52. The Special Mission will maintain its temporary headquarters in Islamabad, until conditions permit it to return to Kabul. Meanwhile, I intend to explore the possible opening of a small office in Turkmenistan in order to enhance the Special Mission's information-gathering and liaison capabilities, especially with those parties for whom the location of the Mission's temporary headquarters in Islamabad presents difficulties.

Conclusions

53. As described in the preceding sections of the present report, a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan remains elusive notwithstanding the untiring efforts of the United Nations to broker peace among the country's warring factions. In the meantime, Afghanistan's civil war has continued to exact a staggering toll in terms of human lives and suffering as well as material destruction. What we are witnessing is a seemingly endless tragedy of epic proportions in which the Afghan people's yearning for peace is being systematically and continually betrayed by leaders and warlords driven by selfish ambitions and thirst for power.

54. In earlier reports I have observed that the Afghan parties and their external supporters, while continuing to pursue military solutions, often also profess support for resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling for a peaceful settlement. Regrettably, their actions seldom seem to be motivated, however, by a desire to contribute to the implementation of those resolutions. Similarly, it is discouraging that with few exceptions, the international community as a whole has shown only limited interest in adopting tangible measures to discourage the Afghan parties and their outside supporters from pursuing their bellicose aims and objectives.

55. There is no doubt that a number of Governments both inside and outside the region would be in a favourable position, should they so decide, to encourage the Afghan parties to overcome their differences and seek a peaceful settlement. It is also clear, however, that as long as those Governments choose not to exercise their influence with the parties in a positive and constructive manner, the efforts made by my representatives, however dedicated and skilled, will not suffice to bring peace to Afghanistan. Sadly, it could be argued that in these circumstances the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan is little more than that of an alibi to provide cover for the inaction - or worse - of the international community at large.

56. Over the past several years, it has become increasingly difficult to justify the continuation of United Nations peace efforts and the attendant costs in the absence of any positive signs suggesting a fundamental change of attitude

on the part of those Governments that are capable of contributing decisively to a peaceful solution of the conflict. Recently, I have been somewhat encouraged, however, by the increased level of attention to the situation in Afghanistan now being manifested by a number of countries that have begun to discuss among themselves the adoption of practical measures to persuade the Afghan parties to embark on serious negotiations. But much more needs to be done by Governments with a greater sense of unity in order for the peace efforts spearheaded by the United Nations to stand a realistic chance of success.

57. I shall continue to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council informed about developments relevant to the search for a ceasefire and, ultimately, a negotiated solution in Afghanistan, including any actions taken by Member States with a bearing on the situation, whether positive or negative. In conclusion, I should like to express my special thanks to Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, whose findings and suggestions form the basis for the present report, as well as to Mr. Norbert Holl, the Head of UNSMA, and his staff who continue to carry out their difficult tasks with the highest degree of dedication and professionalism.



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LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the attached letter dated 5 November 1997, together with the enclosed report from the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States, in accordance with the request contained therein.

(Signed) Kofi ANNAN



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Annex

Letter dated 5 November 1997 from the Executive Secretary
of the Economic Community of West African States to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the first report of the Economic Community of West African States Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, covering the period from 8 October to 5 November 1997, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 9 of resolution 1132 (1997) concerning the situation in Sierra Leone, for onward transmission to the President of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lansana KOUYATE
Executive Secretary

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Appendix

First report of the Economic Community of West African States
Committee of Five on Sierra Leone to the Security Council
made pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

INTRODUCTION

1. On 25 May, 1997, a section of the military in Sierra Leone violently overthrew the legitimate government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.
2. The **coup d'état** was not only notably bloody but it also resulted in very tragic consequences on all class of citizens of the country. Immediately upon siezing power, the coupists threw open the prisons thereby releasing all sorts of criminals and convicts into the streets of the country and invited the rebel forces of the RUF, who had hitherto been scatterd in the jungles of the country, into the city of Freetown. Vital national assets including the Central Bank of Sierra Leone and the Ministry of Finance were looted and vandalised. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people were forced to flee as refugees into neighbouring countries. These refugees had since constituted an additional burden on the societies and fragile economies of these countries. Guinea received the largest number of refugees, including the overthrown President KABBAH and most of his cabinet members and the Sierra Leonean members of Parliament. Some commercial offices, NGOs and international organisations have also relocated to Conakry, Guinea. Liberia too received a good number of refugees, at a time when it was on the verge of consolidating the peace efforts and bringing an end to its seven-year old civil war. In fact, the situation in Sierra Leone constitutes a threat to the peace, stability and security of the entire sub-region.
3. The United Nations therefore became seized of the situation Under chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, and in collaboration with ECOWAS took

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decisive action leading to the adoption of Resolution 1132(1997) of 8 October, 1997. This report is in response to the request of the UN Resolution.

4. For a better understanding of the situation it appears necessary to give a brief history of the crisis in Sierra Leone.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRISIS

5. Sierra Leone is situated on the west coast of Africa, latitudes 7° and 10° North and longitudes 10.50° and 13° West. It shares common borders with the Republic of Liberia and the Republic of Guinea. Its coastline stretches some 300 miles, extending from the boundary with Guinea to the boundary with Liberia.

6. Sierra Leone got independence from Britain on 27 April 1961. The Country attained Republic Status on 19 April, 1971.

7. Upon its gaining independence, Sir Milton Margai became its first Prime Minister under the umbrella of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). He died in 1964. His junior brother, Sir Albert Margai was immediately sworn in as Prime Minister by the British Governor General. He governed the Country until elections in 1967. These elections however ended in chaos and produced Sierra Leone's first military rule. A year later, 1968, another coup organised by warrant officers paved the way for the return of Siaka Stevens from exile in Guinea. Siaka Stevens of the All Peoples Congress (APC) ruled the country from 1968 to 1985. Retired Brigadier Joseph Saidu Momoh took over the reigns of power also under the APC in 1985 and

ruled the Country until his overthrow by the army in April, 1992. On the scene came Captain Valentine Strasser as Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) regime. An in-house coup d'etat by the military overthrew Strasser in January 1996 and Brigadier Maada Bio became the new Chairman of the NPRC. This took place in the middle of preparations for democratic elections. The elections were held on 26 and 27 February and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and his SLPP party emerged victorious. He was sworn into office as the democratically-elected President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, until his undemocratic overthrow on 25 May, 1997.

8. The present crisis in Sierra Leone began in 1991 when rebel elements called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of Corporal Foday Sankoh began guerilla warfare against the Government of Sierra Leone. As the guerilla warfare intensified, resulting in very horrifying consequences on villages around the Country, and in the face of demonstrated inability of the regular Sierra Leone armed forces to contain the situation, locals, with the active support of the Government organised vigilante groups to ward off the atrocities committed by the rebels. These vigilante groups, made up primarily of local hunters and called the Kamajors, gradually grew into prominence with the several successes they achieved over the rebels.

9. Although the Kamajors were initially assisting the soldiers against the RUF rebels, the relationship between the Kamajors and the civilian population on the one hand and the soldiers, on the other, soon became strained. The Kamajors and the soldiers on several occasions fought each other.

10. The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire with the assistance of the OAU and the United Nations came unto the scene to mediate between the antagonists. This mediation effort produced, on 30 November, 1995, the Abidjan Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone under Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the RUF. Unfortunately however, enough efforts and time were not given for the successful implementation of the Abidjan Agreement before the unfortunate incident of 25 May, 1997.

REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS

11. The OAU Heads of State gathering in Harare, Zimbabwe for the 33rd Ordinary Summit of the OAU strongly condemned the unlawful take-over of power and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order to the Country. They urged the international community not to recognise the illegal regime in Sierra Leone and called on the leaders of ECOWAS to take the lead in restoring constitutional order to the country. The Secretary-General of the United Nations who was also in Harare for the Summit endorsed the OAU position. The Secretary-General's position was reinforced by a statement of the President of the UN Security Council on 27 May 1997 condemning the coup d'etat.

12. Meanwhile, the Chairman of ECOWAS had commenced measures aimed at resolving the Sierra Leone crisis. His consultations with the leaders of the sub-region resulted in the convening of a meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers in Conakry on 26 June, 1997. The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone and recommended ways and means of achieving a speedy restoration of constitutional order to the

country. It identified three objectives to be pursued by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone. These are:

- (i) the early reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan KABBAH;
- (ii) the return of peace and security and
- (iii) the resolution of issue of refugees and displaced persons.

13. The Foreign Ministers recommended a combination of three means to be applied in the pursuit of these objectives. These were dialogue, imposition of sanctions, embargo and lastly, the use of force. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers established a Ministerial Committee of Four, comprising the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, to be joined by representatives of the OAU and ECOWAS Secretariats. This Committee was charged with implementing the recommendations and decisions on Sierra Leone. (The Committee was in August 1997 expanded into a Committee of Five by including the Foreign Minister of Liberia).

14. After the Conakry meeting, the newly established Committee on Sierra Leone submitted a report to the current Chairman of ECOWAS, General Sani Abacha in Abuja on 6 July, 1997. The Chairman endorsed the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers and considered it appropriate that ECOWAS' position should be conveyed to the Secretary-General of the UN and the UN Security Council, by the Committee of Four.

15. ECOWAS and the UN individually and collectively continued their efforts to bring an end to the crisis.

16. The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Four (now Five) on Sierra Leone, held several meetings, two of which were with the illegal regime in Abidjan. These negotiations however failed due to the intransigence of the junta thereby compelling the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State to adopt a sanctions and embargo regime against the junta, on 29 August 1997.

17. The UN, on its part, supported the ECOWAS initiative, and in order to extend the scope of the sanctions to the International community, adopted Resolution 1132 (1997) on 8 October, 1997.

18. It would be recalled that the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone decided to resume negotiations with the junta in accordance with its objectives. It would be recalled also that this decision had received the Security Council support under paragraph 3 of Resolution 1132 (1997).

19. For this purpose therefore, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone met in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, on 22 and 23 October, 1997. The Committee was assisted by Professor Ibrahima Fall, who attended the negotiations on behalf of the UN Secretary-General.

20. The Ministers met with a thirteen-member delegation representing the junta. The Committee dwelt extensively on the need for the junta to appreciate fully that

national reconciliation was a pre-condition for the return of peace to Sierra Leone. They were therefore enjoined to let the cause of peace in Sierra Leone override all other considerations and to be mindful of the fact that finding a peaceful resolution lay primarily with Sierra Leoneans themselves.

21. The representatives of Major Johnny Paul Koromah were quick to express their desire to resume discussions with the Committee of Five. They stated their willingness to work towards peace and to negotiate in good faith. They explained that the junta had no intention of remaining in power until 2001 as they had previously announced. They had merely taken that date as an objective: a vision.

22. Major Koromah's representatives considered as unfortunate the imposition of sanctions taken against Sierra Leone. They promised to declare an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, as a mark of good faith and to demonstrate their commitment to peace.

23. Following extensive consultations between the junta's representatives, various telephone conversations between them and Major Koromah and constructive discussions with the Committee of Five, the junta agreed to return Sierra Leone to constitutional governance within a period of six months, effective from 22 October 1997 and agreed on the modalities for restoring President Kabbah to office.

24. The ECOWAS peace plan containing this conclusion and a timetable for its implementation was agreed upon and signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Guinea and by the junta represented by Mr. Alimany

Pallo Bangura, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the AFRC and Colonei Abdul Karim Sesay, Secretary-General of the AFRC. Professor Ibrahima Fall, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs representing the UN Secretary-General and Miss Adwoa Coleman of the OAU Conflict Resolution Division representing the OAU Secretary-General also signed as witnesses (previously circulated in document S/1997/824, annex II).

25. The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone provides for :

- the reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah within a period of six months;
- the immediate cessation of hostilities;
- cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in order to peacefully enforce the sanctions;
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants;
- the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- return of refugees and displaced persons;
- immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the May 25, 1997 coup d'etat; and
- modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone.

**REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE
BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE PLAN (FROM
8 OCTOBER 1997 TO 22 OCTOBER 1997)**

26. This part of the report covers the period between 8 October 1997, the date when

the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132(1997) and 23 October 1997, the date when the ECOWAS Peace Plan was signed. The situation in Sierra Leone which was bad enough at the inception of the coup d'etat deteriorated and changed for the worse during this period, despite the pressure put on the junta by ECOWAS, the UN and the International Community. The junta continued to remain defiant and intransigent towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis and the eventual restoration of the democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. It was clear that the intention of the illegal regime was to fleece the country economically and in the process inflict untold hardship and suffering on the population by embarking on the scorch earth policy. Infact this period marked a turning point in the junta's preconceived determination to remain in power at all cost. The illegal regime persistently attacked and harassed ECOMOG troops; including the employment of massive propaganda to achieve their unpopular goal.

27. Despite world-wide condemnation, the junta in Sierra Leone continued to refuse to discuss the handover of power to President Kabbah, rather, the junta showed determination to perpetuate its illegal regime in power. The regime went ahead to appoint its cabinet and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) as its highest ruling body. The general public in Sierra Leone remained resolved that the illegal regime must quit for the legitimate democratic government. The resentment of the people towards the junta was seen in the various demonstrations organised by the Sierra Leonean's civilian populace notably students, trade unions and other pressure groups.

28. In reacting to the hostile and uncomfortable situation in which it finds itself, the junta continued to mistreat, detain and even kill vocal opponents of the regime. Properties of all known members of the opposition were destroyed while there was a massive hunt for leaders of the opposition group. The junta also continued to send emissaries to garner support for its illegal government while making efforts to pile up military arsenal to defend itself against forceful ejection. It continued to recruit and train unwilling citizens to fight its illegal course. On the whole, however, the junta could still not claim any followership because the majority of the Sierra Leonean people continued to clamour for the restoration of the legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah.

29. The violations became more pronounced and rampant with each passing day during this period, resulting in the continuous exodus of Sierra Leoneans into neighbouring countries to escape the junta's brutalities. Citizens were dispossessed of their houses and personal effects to provide accommodation and comfort for the AFRC members. ECOMOG intelligence uncovered a plan by the junta to abduct ECOWAS citizens, especially Nigerians, Guineans and Ghanaians and hold them hostage to serve as a human shield and a bargaining chip for future negotiations.

30. The AFRC and RUF continued to brutalise the citizens of Sierra Leone. The most common excuse for these acts is the allegation that the victims are supporters of President Tejan Kabbah and are engaged in passing information to FM 98.1 of President Kabbah.

**SITUATION REPORT IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER THE
SIGNING OF THE PEACE PLAN (22 OCTOBER 1997 TO 5 NOVEMBER
1997)**

31. This part of the report covers the period beginning from the day the peace plan was signed to 5 November, 1997.

32. Cessation of Hostilities : All hostilities have ceased. Combatants are holding on to their positions.

33. Implementation of the Peace Plan : The AFRC/RUF junta has agreed to meet and discuss with the ECOMOG High Command on modalities for the implementation of the Peace Plan. This meeting is scheduled to be held within the week beginning 3 November, 1997.

34. Violations of the Sanctions : Merchant ships continue to enter Sierra Leone ports to discharge their cargoes.

35. Effects of the Sanctions : There is currently acute scarcity of petroleum, petroleum products and food.

36. Humanitarian Services : Only ECOMOG is currently rendering humanitarian services. The situation of displaced persons and refugees who have flooded ECOMOG-controlled areas had worsened due to absence of relief materials.

37. Violations of the Peace Plan: Major Victor King, the AFRC/RUF spokesman was reported in a radio broadcast to have said that the junta had taken delivery of modern sophisticated weapons from some developed countries and was therefore ready to engage ECOMOG in warfare.

38. Human Rights Violations : The illegal harassment, arrest and detention of innocent citizens have continued unabated. During this reporting period, the AFRC/RUF junta had carried out the following human rights violations.

- On 23 October 1997, the very day the ECOWAS Peace Plan was signed, there was an all night shooting and looting in Freetown resulting in the killing of two persons and injury of seventeen others.

- On 24 October, 1997, residents of Cockril Bay, Murray Town, Lablin off Wilkinson road and Collegeant School Road, all in Freetown, were heavily teargased by the AFRC. A lot of people were suffocated and hospitalised.

- On 24 October, 1997, Mr. Suleiman Bah was shot by three soldiers led by a lieutenant around York village by Pennisula Road.

- On 25 October, 1997, ten (10) soldiers of the Sierra Leone army were executed.

- Two civilians, namely Mr Alfred Koromah and Mr. Abdulazeez Kamara

were shot in Freetown, also on 25 October 1997.

- The AFRC/RUF illegal regime has fully jammed the Radio FM 98.1 frequency being used by the Government of President Tejan Kabbah to transmit to his people. The junta is now transmitting on the same frequency.

39. The leader of the AFRC/RVF junta delivered a radio broadcast on 4 November 1997. The broadcast is a comment on the ECOWAS Peace Plan.

ENFORCEMENT OF ECOWAS AND UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS BY ECOMOG

40. ECOMOG activities in Sierra Leone have been guided by the decision of the ECOWAS Heads of States and Government and the UN Resolution (1132) of 8 October 1997. ECOMOG operations are tailored towards enforcing the blockade of supplies of petroleum products and military hard and soft ware to the junta. Consequently, ECOMOG's operations are directed at preventing the entry of ships to the ports, blocking off of land supply routes and denying the junta the use of its air space for operations. ECOMOG also inspects all vehicles, vessels and aircraft going into Sierra Leone to verify that their cargo contain only humanitarian supplies.

41. ECOMOG operations have been largely handicapped by lack of serviceable ships to effect this blockade by sea. The above notwithstanding, ECOMOG is enforcing the embargo. ECOMOG's fleet of aircraft have done a tremendous job in

scaring off defiant ships and providing close air support for its troops. The illegal regime's reaction to the blockade was to attack ECOMOG positions with a view to breaking out. This has not been successful since ECOMOG forces have always effectively reacted to such attacks. The regime is however quick at accusing ECOMOG through its propaganda that civil targets are being attacked. The truth, however, is that the junta's anti aircraft guns are deliberately deployed in the civilian populated areas to forestall ECOMOG reprisals. In carrying out its mandate, ECOMOG had continued to ensure that the innocent and law abiding citizens do not suffer.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

42. The worsening situation of the crisis in Sierra Leone has led to the increase in the number of Sierra Leone refugees in the neighbouring States of Guinea and Liberia. This has further threatened peace and security in the sub-region. Guinea has approximately 450,000 refugees including both Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. This number increases on a daily basis. Even though the UNHCR put the figures of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia at between 110,000 and 120,000. We are aware that the refugees as at mid October, 1997 are distributed as follows:

a.	Samukai Town	-	7,071
b.	VOA I Camp	-	5,209
c.	Ministry of Health (MOH) Camp	-	860
d.	Zuannah Town	-	4,262
e.	Banjor Town	-	6,258

f.	Sinje (Grand Cape Mount County)	-	4,000
g.	Congo Mano	-	7,725
h.	Margibi County	-	177
i.	Lofa County	-	65,000
j.	Bong County	-	2,000
k.	Bomi County	-	1,500

43. It is also of note that most of the troops of the Sierra Leonean Contingent in ECOMOG now accommodate their families in Monrovia due to the crisis in their patrimony. It is important to assist the refugees, most of whom have been dispossessed of their personal effects by some elements of the rebels.

44. The number of internally displaced persons had greatly increased. ECOMOG locations are safe havens for the internally displaced persons and refugees. Humanitarian supplies continue to pass freely through ECOMOG-controlled areas to the needy, while protecting vital installations and public utilities. Combat patrols are regularly conducted to create a conducive atmosphere for ECOMOG's operations and confidence building patrols had also been embarked upon to assure the citizenry of their security in ECOMOG protected areas. ECOMOG had rendered assistance to the civil populace under its controlled areas in the provision of medication, food, water and security.

45. ECOMOG notified all Humanitarian Agencies and NGOs who would wish to bring in relief materials that they would be allowed into Sierra Leonean territorial waters upon clearance by ECOMOG. They were to be checked to confirm that only

humanitarian goods, as declared by them, were brought into Sierra Leone. Inspection of vessels sailing from Europe, the Far East, North & South America and the Mediterranean would be conducted in Guinea while those coming from South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria and Ghana would be inspected in Liberia before proceeding to Sierra Leone to berth and discharge their cargo. This was an interim measure adopted until ECOMOG vessels are positioned close to the port of Freetown.

46. It should be recalled that the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone had, during its Fifth Meeting held in Abuja on 10 and 11 October 1997 directed the ECOWAS Executive Secretary to establish a technical committee to work out appropriate modalities for the:

- (i) creation of safe havens,
- (ii) establishment of humanitarian corridors for delivery of relief materials,
- (iii) registration of NGOs.

The Technical Committee was also tasked by the Ministers to advise on all issues relating to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

47. In compliance with this mandate, the Executive Secretary established a Technical Committee for the implementation of ECOWAS Decisions and the UN Resolution.

The Technical Committee is composed of the Ambassadors of the Committee of Five accredited to Nigeria, namely, the Ambassadors of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea,

Ghana and Liberia. Nigeria is to be represented by a representative of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also on the Technical Committee are three (3) members of staff of the ECOWAS Secretariat and the ECOMOG Liaison Officer in the Secretariat.

48. The Committee held its inaugural meeting on 28 October 1997 and agreed to the following working modalities :

- The Committee will maintain constant touch with ECOMOG, at both its headquarters in Monrovia and its field operations in Sierra Leone, so as to closely monitor the situation.

- The Committee will work with ECOMOG and designated representatives in ECOWAS Member States and Humanitarian agencies to evolve a simplified and speedy process for the delivery of humanitarian relief materials.

- Considering the fact that most humanitarian agencies had, due to security reasons, relocated their offices to neighbouring states from Sierra Leone, the Committee decided to work closely with the national focal points and the humanitarian agencies in those countries i.e Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

**RECOMMENDATIONS TO ECOWAS ON CROSS-BORDER
RELIEF OPERATIONS INTO SIERRA LEONE**

49. At the request of the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, the UN provided ECOWAS with a set of recommendations on the modalities for humanitarian cross-border relief operations into Sierra Leone and the mechanism by which categories of relief items would be exempt from ECOWAS sanctions.

50. ECOWAS had studied these recommendations and has accepted that there is an urgent need to establish a simple, practical and efficient mechanism to deal with requests for exemptions and delivery of humanitarian relief assistance. For this purpose, the Executive Secretary is despatching a team to Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia to meet the relevant Government organs, humanitarian agencies and concerned NGOs.

51. ECOWAS also accepts the proposal that each ECOWAS Member State shall designate a Responsible Ministry as "focal point" as part of the mechanism that will, as required, to attend the day-to-day matters connected with the implementation of exemptions related issues.

52. ECOWAS has further decided that it shall be the responsibility of the ECOWAS Technical Committee on Sanction, ECOMOG, UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the focal points in Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to monitor and report on humanitarian cross-border operations from those countries into Sierra Leone.

53. The ECOWAS Technical Committee on Sanctions will elaborate further on these proposals as well as monitor closely the operations in these countries and other ECOWAS Member States.

54. Lastly, It is desirous that ECOWAS enters into a Protocol for Humanitarian Agencies in Sierra Leone with the United Nations as soon as possible.

CONCLUSIONS

55. ECOWAS expresses its appreciation to the UN, the United Nations Security Council and the UN Secretary-General as well as the OAU for their cooperation and assistance to ECOWAS and renewed its appeal to the UN, OAU, ECOWAS Member States and the international community to provide necessary assistance for the realisation of its objectives in Sierra Leone, including appropriate humanitarian assistance to the refugees especially in the neighbouring countries of Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire as well as to displaced persons and to facilitate their return.

56. ECOWAS is committed to continue negotiations with the junta towards effective and prompt implementation of the peace plan.

57. ECOWAS, the OAU, UN and the rest of the international community should continue to put pressure on the illegal regime so that it could comply with the ECOWAS peace plan within its stipulated time frame.

58. ECOWAS Member States are urged to strengthen the operational capacities of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone to enable the force carry out effectively the mission assigned to it in the Decision of the Heads of State and Government, the UN Security Council Resolution and the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone.

59. ECOWAS appeals to the international community to provide ECOMOG with the necessary material and logistic support.

60. The international community is urged to assist with the reintegration of disarmed former fighters into their various communities.

61. The United Nations should assist in obtaining emergency humanitarian aid for the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Sierra Leone.

62. ECOWAS requests the United Nations Security Council to send a team of United Nations military observers to participate in the monitoring and verification of complete cessation of hostilities, as envisaged in the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone.

63. ECOWAS appeals to the Un Secretary-General to use his good offices to urgently establish a Contact Group on Sierra Leone.
